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█ Abstract In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach to-
wards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equal-
ly well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which 
phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by virtue of certain psychophysical 
laws of nature. Nannini proposes that in contrast to dualistic theses which represent the manifest image of the 
world, eliminativism represents the world’s scientific image just as classical physics and theories of relativity re-
spectively represent the world’s manifest image and scientific image. And if developments in a scientific field 
reveal a conflict between these two images we should always vote for the scientific image. In our second line of 
argument, we challenge this claim by comparing two rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Co-
penhagen and Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we argue that Nannini’s identification 
of consciousness and the Self as illusions does not shed any light on the hard problem of consciousness since 
illusions themselves are instances of phenomenal experiences and need to be explained. 
KEYWORDS: Naturalistic Dualism; Hard Problem of Consciousness; Emergentism; Eliminativism. 
 
█ Riassunto La coscienza: emergente e reale - In questo articolo proponiamo tre line argomentative contro 
l’approccio eliminativista di Nannini rispetto alla coscienza e al Sé. Anzitutto suggeriamo che le premesse su cui 
fa leva per argomentare a favore dell’eliminativismo possono essere utilizzate anche per supportare una conclu-
sione completamente differente che propende a favore di un dualismo naturalistico per cui la coscienza feno-
menale emerge irriducibilmente da un sostrato fisico in virtù di certe leggi di natura. Secondo Nannini, contra-
riamente rispetto alle tesi dualistiche che descrivono l’immagine manifesta del mondo, l’eliminativismo 
rappresenta l’immagine scientifica del mondo. Il parallelismo è con la fisica classica e con le teorie della relativi-
tà che a suo avviso descrivono rispettivamente l’immagine manifesta e quella scientifica del mondo. Laddove 
queste due immagini confliggano – questa la posizione di Nannini – dovremmo sempre propendere per quella 
scientifica. Nella nostra seconda linea argomentativa critichiamo questa posizione sulla base della comparazio-
ne fra due interpretazioni rivali della quantomeccanica, ossia l’interpretazione di Copenhagen e quella di Bohm. 
Infine sosteniamo che la tesi proposta da Nannini per cui la coscienza e il Sè sono mere illusioni non getta alcu-
na luce sull’hard problem of consciousness poiché le illusioni stesse sono istanze delle esperienze fenomenali che 
devono essere spiegate. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Dualismo naturalistico; Hard Problem of Consciousness; Emergentismo; Eliminativismo.
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SANDRO NANNINI CLAIMS THAT TO over-
come the hard problem of consciousness, as a 
non-scientific, philosophical pseudo-
problem, a paradigm shift in the science of 
mind is required, just like the one we wit-
nessed in physics regarding the transition 
from classical mechanics to the theories of 
relativity at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry.1 This transition reconciled classical me-
chanics with the theory of electromagnetism. 
Once we identify similarities between the 
paradigm shift in physics and what is sug-
gested by eliminativist cognitive neuroscien-
tists, we may understand why reducing “con-
sciousness” and “the Self” to physical aspects 
of brain dynamics appears to be implausible 
from the common sense perspective although 
the reduction is scientifically sound.  
He then proceeds by proposing a natural-
ized theory of consciousness combining Ber-
nard Baars’s2 concept of the Global Workspace 
or, alternatively, Gerald Edelman’s concept of 
the Dynamic Core3 with the thesis of synchro-
nization of oscillating neural circuits, initially 
proposed by Crick and Koch.4 Nannini con-
cludes that “consciousness” and “the Self” as 
they appear to us are merely illusions that are 
biologically beneficial for our existence.  
We propose three lines of argumentation, 
opposing Nannini’s claims. The first line 
takes Nannini’s premises for granted draw-
ing, however, a completely different conclu-
sion in favor of so-called “naturalistic dual-
ism”5 according to which phenomenal con-
sciousness is ontologically independent of 
physical properties but arises from a physical 
substrate by virtue of certain contingent laws 
of nature. Phenomenal consciousness, then, 
is a fundamentally new property ontological-
ly and epistemologically irreducible to physi-
cal properties.  
By taking another fundamental paradigm 
shift in physics into account, namely the 
transition from classical mechanics to quan-
tum mechanics, our second line of argumen-
tation targets Nannini’s claim that if the de-
velopment of a science unveils a conflict be-
tween the “scientific image” and the “mani-
fest image” of the world, we should always 
vote for the “scientific image”. Comparing 
two rival interpretations of quantum me-
chanics, that is, the Bohmian interpretation 
and the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, we argue that Nannini too 
hastily forces us to decide between the two 
“images”. We think it wise to opt for that 
“scientific image” which does most justice to 
the world’s “manifest image”, particularly if 
no other ‘scientific image’ is superior to it by 
purely scientific standards.  
Finally, our third line of argumentation 
critically addresses Nannini’s claim that 
“consciousness” and “the Self” are illusions 
which are evolutionary beneficial for us. We 
argue that identifying “consciousness” and 
“the Self” as illusions does not shed any light 
on the hard problem of consciousness since 
“illusion” itself, as an instance of phenomenal 
experiences, needs to be ontologically and 
epistemologically explained. And if Nannini 
raises the same eliminativist argument in 
identifying “illusions” as reducible properties 
of brain activity, he will encounter our first 
two lines of argumentation against his 
claims. 
Let us start with the story of electromag-
netism in 19th century. There were electro-
magnetic phenomena which could not be ex-
plained in terms of current physical laws in-
cluding mechanical principles and the like. In 
other words, there were electromagnetic 
phenomena which were not explanatorily re-
ducible to Newtonian mechanics. To explain 
such phenomena, new features and laws oth-
er than what had already been introduced by 
Newtonian mechanics had to be taken as 
fundamental: “electromagnetic charge” and 
“electromagnetic forces”, for example, as 
fundamental features and Maxwell’s elec-
tromagnetic laws as fundamental laws.  
The development of special relativity was 
also the result of the inconsistency of New-
tonian mechanics with Maxwell’s equations 
of electromagnetism as well as the failure to 
confirm that the Earth travelled through a 
luminiferous aether. The paradigm shift 
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brought about by Einstein through his special 
relativity was first and foremost on the basis 
of the fundamental laws known as “postu-
lates of special relativity” according to which 
the laws of physics are invariant in all inertial 
systems and the speed of light in a vacuum is 
the same for all observers. Although special 
relativity can be derived only from these two 
postulates, there are also some tacit funda-
mental assumptions, for example, the isotro-
py and homogeneity of space and the inde-
pendence of measuring rods and clocks on 
their past history.  
Now we can make a parallel between the 
above paradigm shift in physics and a new 
science of the mind, this time, however, not 
by embracing eliminativism, but by taking 
phenomenal consciousness as a fundamental 
property introducing a natural psychophysi-
cal law that brings out a crucial link between 
physical and phenomenal properties. 
Through his thesis of naturalistic dualism, 
Chalmers introduces his “double-aspect the-
ory of information” as just such a psycho-
physical law according to which information 
is realized phenomenally whenever there has 
already been corresponding physically real-
ized information.6 More recently, proposing 
his Integrated Information Theory (IIT) To-
noni7 adopts a similar approach to con-
sciousness. He takes consciousness to be a 
fundamental property and links it to physical 
properties through axioms. Phenomenal con-
sciousness, in this alternative account, can 
irreducibly emerge from brain dynamics im-
plemented by synchronization of oscillating 
neural circuits, as its neural correlates, 
through a natural psychophysical law.8  
As seen, it is possible to identify similari-
ties between the paradigm shift in physics 
and what is suggested by the thesis of natu-
ralistic dualism. Naturalistic dualism, as a 
sort of property dualism, is as scientific as 
eliminativism and no experimentation can 
confirm one thesis over the other. However, 
naturalistic dualism, we think, would be less 
counterintuitive and more plausible to com-
mon sense since it can address the first-
person transparent experiences to which we 
have immediate access.  
And here comes another objection to 
Nannini’s proposal where he quotes Sellars9 
claiming that we should vote for the “scien-
tific image” against the “manifest image” of 
the world if the development of a science re-
veals a conflict between the two images. To 
show that this idea is biased we may take into 
account another fundamental paradigm shift 
in physics, i.e. the transition from classical to 
quantum mechanics.  
Consider the double-slit experiment as a 
paradigmatic quantum experiment in which 
the bizarre quantum features are revealed. 
Nearly all interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics are inspired by the latter experiment. Take 
two of the mainstream interpretations pro-
posed, that is, the Copenhagen interpretation10 
which is based on orthodox quantum theory 
and Bohmian interpretation corresponding to 
the so-called de Broglie-Bohm theory.  
The Copenhagen interpretation counter-
intuitively in principle prohibits any attribu-
tion of any property to quantum systems and 
their behavior before, during and after the 
act of measurement. It is impossible, in this 
interpretation, to make a sharp separation 
between the behavior of atomic objects and 
their interaction with measuring devices.11 
According to this interpretation, only the rep-
resentations of the interactions between quan-
tum systems and measuring instruments are 
describable and publicly communicable in 
terms of classical concepts (linguistic terms). 
The Copenhagen interpretation, then, gives a 
central, but highly ambiguous and counterin-
tuitive, role to the act of measurement.  
In the non-relativistic domain of quan-
tum mechanics, the de Broglie-Bohm theory 
reproduces all predictions of orthodox quan-
tum theory. Contrary to the Copenhagen in-
terpretation, Bohmian interpretation pro-
vides a full ontological description of the 
mechanisms involved before and after the 
appearance of the interference pattern 
(bright and dark bands) in the double-slit ex-
periment giving no special role to the act of 
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measurement.12 Although the Bohmian inter-
pretation also has some non-classical, counter-
intuitive elements,13 the interpretation is 
much closer to common sense than the Co-
penhagen interpretation. In this interpreta-
tion quantum particles move along the so-
called Bohmian trajectories under the action 
of a novel “quantum force” which, in the dou-
ble-slit experiment, affects every quantum 
particle making each particle follow a particu-
lar path and go through one of the slits leaving 
an individual spot on the photographic plate 
placed behind the slits. The spots collectively 
form an interference pattern.14   
Note that none of the two rival interpre-
tations can be confirmed experimentally with 
complete precision. Granted that the Bohm-
ian interpretation is closer to the “manifest 
image” of the world and given that the de 
Broglie-Bohm theory reproduces all predic-
tions of orthodox quantum theory, the ques-
tion is: how do we choose between these two 
theories and the associated interpretations?  
We, in that case, would opt for the theory 
that does more justice to the “manifest im-
age”, although the majority of physicists re-
gard orthodox quantum theory and the asso-
ciated interpretation as more scientific than 
the rival interpretations. Giving more scien-
tific significance to the Copenhagen interpre-
tation, however, is not based on real scien-
tific grounds, but on social, historical and 
psychological ones.  
Furthermore, what may be a less acknow-
ledged “scientific image” now may turn into a 
strongly acknowledged “scientific image” in 
the future. For instance, recently, the Bohm-
ian interpretation has acquired more scientific 
credit in terms of attracting scientists’ atten-
tion. In 2011, Kocsis and colleagues reported 
the experimental observation of the “average 
trajectories of single photons” in a double-slit 
experiment.15 This research was selected as 
the top breakthrough in physics in 2011 by 
Physics World. Also, in a highly publicised 
paper, Menzel and colleagues16 claimed to 
have identified the path of each particle wit-
hout any adverse effects at all on the interfe-
rence patterns generated by the particles. 
One may now draw a parallel between the 
two rival interpretations in the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics and naturalistic dualism 
and eliminativism in the philosophy of mind. 
As we saw, Nannini’s line of argumentation 
in favor of eliminativism can also be used in 
favor of naturalistic dualism and there are no 
scientific grounds to give significance and 
priority to one over the other. This would 
highlight the Hard Problem of Consciousness 
in a different manner. And again, we would 
opt for the scientific theory that does more 
justice to the “manifest image”. 
The third line of argumentation against 
Nannini’s proposal targets his identification 
of “consciousness” and “the Self” as “illu-
sions” biologically beneficial for our exist-
ence. First of all, by such identification, he 
can’t mean that we are wrong about having 
phenomenal experiences; at best, we might 
be wrong about some further facts we infer 
from having phenomenal consciousness – 
e.g., that we are Cartesian subjects with some 
life-long personal identity. However, we may 
not be wrong about inferring that our phe-
nomenal experiences irreducibly emerge 
from a physical substrate by virtue of certain 
contingent laws of nature. The reason for the 
plausibility of such a naturalistic dualistic 
thesis is – as we saw – that it can be equally 
plausibly inferred from the same premises 
that Nannini’s eliminativist argument is in-
ferred from and no experimental evidence 
can confirm one thesis over the other.   
Secondly, if we take for granted that, as 
Nannini maintains, “consciousness” and “the 
Self” are identified as illusions, the question, 
then, is: does such identification shed more 
light on the hard problem of consciousness 
from Nannini’s eliminativist point of view? 
Our answer to this question is negative. An 
illusion is a phenomenal experience which 
itself cries out for explanation; it is not any-
thing ontologically independent of our quali-
tative experiences. Therefore, as an instance 
of phenomenal consciousness, the notion of 
illusion in Nannini’s argument must be onto-
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logically and epistemologically explained, it 
does not explain anything regarding phe-
nomenal consciousness. 
All Nannini can do in response to this ob-
jection is, once more, to raise an eliminativist 
argument identifying “illusions” as being on-
tologically and epistemologically reducible to 
brain dynamics, just as he did when reducing 
“consciousness” to brain processes. In this 
case, our first two lines of argumentation 
would come into play again. Hence, contrary 
to what Nannini intends to show, the Hard 
Problem of Consciousness has not been dis-
solved, it remains indispensable.17 
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